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Abstract 
As a nation, Americans are underprepared for disasters. Part of this problem stems from 
our inability to define the threats we face and from our inability to fully and properly define 
preparedness. In this paper, I propose a plan to assess a region’s threat-level and preparedness-
level. Once a professional obtains these values, they can compare them to assess the region’s 
needs and to help in spending allocations. To assist in explanation, two cities’ disaster threats 
are analyzed to point out weaknesses that the general public may not understand. Galveston, 
Texas is one of these cities and is also where I completed my field experience. During this time, 
I learned about Galveston County’s disaster plans, specifically those for hurricane recovery and 
Points of Dispensing during the recovery process.  
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Preface 
On a sunny, warm July afternoon on Bolivar Peninsula in southeast Texas, during my 
daily walk on the beach, I note the cooler than usual water. I discuss this with a local and they 
inform me of the benefit: the cooler water keeps away tropical storms. Such storms remain 
fresh in the minds of those in the area; hurricane Ike roared ashore in September of 2008. The 
storm surge slowly rose from both sides of the peninsula, gradually engulfing beaches, bait 
shops, restaurants, and eventually almost the entire peninsula and wiping away most of the 
houses. Ike left behind an in-ground debris field and an off-shore debris field of homes and 
other wreckage. The storm surge topped out at 15 feet (2008 Atlantic hurricane season, 2013), 
above most building code minimum heights at that time. Those homes not as badly affected by 
the water still faced boats, cars, debris, and even other buildings washing through their pylons.  
 
 
Figure 2: Aerial view of damage after Hurricane Ike on Bolivar Peninsula, Texas on September 22, 2008 (Augustino, 2009) 
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Introduction 
With hurricanes, the constant threat of bioterrorism and also the region-specific hazard 
of refinery explosion, Texas’ Gulf Coast region needs many different disaster preparedness 
plans. Due to their long history of hurricanes and other disasters, the Galveston area survivors 
have recovery operations and methods down to a science, making it a good area to study. I 
traveled to the Galveston region to complete an internship at the Galveston County Health 
District working with their Public Health Preparedness specialists and Epidemiologists to gain a 
better understanding of what goes into hurricane and general disaster preparedness planning. I 
spent the majority of my time with the public health preparedness professionals getting their 
Medical Reserve Corps organized, trained, and helping with a large volunteer recruitment drive. 
I arrived at the end of May, just in time to help with the beginning of hurricane season, 
community education, and preparedness. While hurricane preparedness remains first and 
foremost in Texans’ minds, they plan for almost all possible scenarios. “Public health readiness 
and response activities can be conceptualized similarly for intentional attacks, natural disasters, 
and human-caused attacks” (Barnett, 2005, p. 561). Even the federal government recognized 
this need and instead of constructing many detailed plans adopted the “all-hazards response 
model as its fundamental paradigm” (Barnett, 2005, p. 561). This improves efficacy and 
efficiency by reducing the need to form a family of disaster plans for every possible scenario.  
 
Emergency preparedness refers to the capability of individuals, as well as 
public health and risk organizations and communities to prevent, protect 
against, quickly respond to, and recover from emergencies. The term 
“emergency” connotes the sense of a sudden and unexpected onset of a 
disaster, but it also can be applied to other situations, which may not reach 
the level of a “disaster.” From a public health perspective, emergencies tend to 
be characterized by disruptions in essential services, such as utilities, 
transportation, and food supply; the potential damage or destruction of 
dwellings and businesses; and the need for evacuation or rescue. (Paek, 2010, 
p. 429) 
  
2 
 
Objectives 
 To learn about day-to-day activities in a health department/district 
 To observe and learn about public health emergency preparedness planning 
 To assist in emergency preparedness volunteer exercises and planning 
 To help the Galveston County Health District prepare to respond in case of a public 
health emergency 
 To learn about the plans in place in case of a hurricane or other disaster along Texas’ 
Gulf Coast 
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CHAPTER 1: Threats vs. Preparedness 
Here in the United States, we lack overall preparedness for emergencies (Paek, 2010). 
This includes terrorism, natural disasters, or man-made accidents. Extensively discussed by 
journal articles and books,  experts question the concept of preparedness. Many can spout off a 
dictionary definition about readiness for any situation that arises and some may even mention 
the necessity of having multiple plans or one encompassing plan. Either way, this narrow focus 
solely on preparedness falls short.  
Threat-Level and Preparedness-Level Analysis 
In order to make a comprehensive preparedness plan, planners need to take their 
threats into account. They need know their vulnerability to disasters, both man-made and 
naturally caused. This section explores the idea of nation-wide threat-level analysis and 
preparedness-level analysis. This would allow planners to know, based on a standardized 
assessment, where they should concentrate their efforts. Such a plan would not only benefit 
those constructing the plans, but also the government and others in seeking funding by 
showing constituents where they are falling short. Finally, this would benefit the general public 
because they would be more aware of threats in their area and actions being taken to protect 
them in a much easier and straight-forward manner.  
Public health professionals and other disaster planners need to know their 
vulnerabilities to disasters in order to properly build preparedness plans. Dr. Irwin Redlener, 
Director of the National Center for Disaster Preparedeness at Columbia University’s Mailman 
School of Public Health, states it best in his book Americans at Risk: Why We Are Not 
Prepared for Megadisasters and What we Can do Now when he writes, “a better state of 
readiness for major disasters will mean having the courage to accept the threats that are real 
and the discipline to design and implement strategies that could actually make a difference” 
(pg. XXV). To assist professionals in accepting these threats, I propose a threat level assessment 
scale. This program would analyze each disaster or threat for the region and dissect it into 
multiple indices, each given a different weight. The analysis and weights would get assigned 
numbers based on professional evaluation and research. In the end, the disaster planners will 
have numerical assessments of the threat-level for their region. Interested parties can then 
compare this value to a similar value for the regional disaster preparedness assessment to 
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determine the balance between threat-level and preparedness-level. This will help with what 
Redlener defines as the purpose of disaster planning: “to find that ‘sweet spot’ where we set 
goals reflecting a prudent level of readiness that neither drains the treasury, nor fosters an 
obsession with disaster risk” (pg. 103). 
Threat-level analysis 
For each disaster or other threat to a region, professionals need to assess many factors, 
including but not limited to: how many people affected (including assessing demographics), 
how many businesses affected, how many homes affected, hospitals and medical facilities 
affected and/or needed, amount of equipment lost, infrastructure upset, financial cost to 
rebuild, financial loss while out of commission, livelihood upset, other areas in the region 
needed to support or shelter evacuees, lives lost, and emotional toll. The figures to construct 
the proposed scale for each factor, including the weighing index need determination by experts 
in each respective field. That is beyond the breadth of this proposal. The value from this 
assessment can then be weighed against the value from the preparedness assessment to 
determine the balance between preparedness and vulnerability. Even areas not directly 
affected by the event should still consider the effects of having large numbers of evacuees. This 
falls not only into a threat to those areas but also a factor they must take into consideration 
during preparedness.  
Preparedness-level analysis 
Once again, this analysis should be run for each disaster or threat to a region but this 
analysis also includes three sections: before, during, and after the event. In assessing 
preparedness before the event, professionals will look at prevention, prediction, and 
preparedness for the event. This includes addressing such issues as: Can the event be 
prevented? Can it be predicted, and if so, with how much notice? Can it be avoided/ can 
individuals evacuate? Are appropriate buildings/ sensors? How much public awareness is in 
place (including awareness of the threat and any plans)? How much is the public educated/ 
aware? Are emergency facilities in the area prepared? In assessing the preparedness for during 
an emergency event, the assessment should include dissecting evacuation plans (especially 
evacuation of medical facilities), the possibility of sheltering in place, and the need for 
monitoring the disaster as it unfolds (e.g. weather stations, etc). Finally, in the aftermath, 
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preparedness assessments look at plans such as Points of Dispensing, recovery efforts, search 
and rescue, patrols for those returning or to keep residents from returning, security to prevent 
looting, insurance necessary in the region, body disposal, medical care, rebuilding the 
infrastructure, and many other region-specific or disaster-specific needs.  
Even with this extensive analysis, planners cannot think of every scenario or anticipate 
every aspect of a disaster—they need flexibility and to learn from past experiences.  
Sample Analyses  
One cannot fully understand the meaning of preparedness until they completely 
appreciate their vulnerabilities. For an example, the next section compares and contrasts two 
very different cities: Manhattan, Kansas and Galveston, Texas. These act as examples of very 
different climates and settings with one lying in the Midwest and the other along the coastline.  
 
Statistics from Wikipedia Galveston, Texas Manhattan, Kansas 
Area (total square miles) 208.3 18.79 
Area covered by water (mi2) 162.2 (77.85%) 0.03 
Area land (mi2) 46.1 18.76 
Population (2012 statistics) 47,762 56,069 
“Current” conditions via weather.com 
at 2:00pm on 10/2/2013 
Partly cloudy Fair 
       Temperature 85°/ feels like 95° 81°/ feels like 83° 
        Wind SSE at 9mph S at 11 mph 
        Humidity 79% 66% 
Table 1: Galveston and Manhattan statistics from Wikipedia and weather.com 
 
Manhattan, Kansas 
On first impression, Manhattan may not come across as having much to worry about. 
Near the center of the country, this small city lies nestled between the Kansas River and the Big 
Blue River in north eastern Kansas. Home to Kansas State University (KSU), this college-town 
sits on the majestic Konza Prairie, among the rolling Flint Hills. Home to Sunset Zoo, a modest 
zoo that houses bears, tigers and multiple species of primates, Manhattan also has a regional 
airport and the Biosecurity Research Institute (BRI). A biocontainment level 3 lab, by the year 
2020, the BRI will also host the National Bio and Agro-defense Facility (NBAF). Manhattan 
neighbors Fort Riley, the home of the Big Red One first infantry division.  Militarily speaking, the 
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Whiteman Air force Base lies just a few hours’ drive away in central Missouri. Overall, this 
sleepy little college town in the middle of the country has a deep, dark secret.  
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Figure 3: Google earth 
image of Manhattan with 
labels added by the author 
Manhattanites ignorantly live in danger. In the middle of the tornado belt, most Kansans 
including those in Manhattan understand the risks of tornados. The real danger, however, lies 
just below the surface. The Nemaha Ridge, a long structure bounded by several faults, runs 
near Manhattan. The Humboldt Fault Zone poses a particular risk to the Little Apple. In 1867, an 
earthquake measuring 5.1 on the Richter scale (explained in Appendix B) shook Manhattan 
(Wikipedia, 2013). The earthquake caused no fatalities, just injuries and relatively minor 
architectural damage. The Humboldt Fault Zone lies a mere 12 miles east of the Tuttle Creek 
Reservoir near Manhattan. If an earthquake destroyed the Tuttle Creek Dam, this would release 
300,000 feet of water per second, flooding the nearby area. In addition to tornadoes and 
earthquakes, Manhattan also faces the risk 
of flooding even without the dam breaking; 
it lies in the flood plain between the Kansas 
and Big Blue rivers. Due to its location in 
the Great Plains, Manhattan experiences an 
extreme range in temperatures. With the 
possibly of up to a foot of snow 
accumulation over the winter and 
temperatures reaching the century mark 
during the summer, extreme weather poses 
a year-round threat. Other hazards facing 
Manhattan residents come from man-made dangers instead of natural disasters. First, from 
within her own borders, Manhattan faces risks posed by having an airport, those from wild 
animals in the zoo, and possible pathogen release from the BRI and future NBAF (either 
intentional or accidental). The risk from the airport comes from having increased accessibility 
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Figure 4: Current BRI and future NBAF sites 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manhattan,_Kansas 
 
Figure 5: Google earth images of 
Galveston with labels added by 
the author 
and speed of travel to the small town, allowing for a 
possible disease outbreak to enter via air transport and 
threat of terrorism. While over-sensationalized in current 
movies, disease entry and transport via airlines truly 
threatens Americans every day. Additionally, Kansans may 
chuckle at the mention of “lions and tigers and bears” but 
“oh my!” would these become a problem if something 
happened, such as a tornado, to damage the zoo’s animal 
enclosures. Finally, the BRI houses up to Biosafety Level 3 
(BSL 3) pathogens, possibly including rabies virus, Yersenia pestis (the bacterium which causes 
the Black Plague), West Nile Virus, SARS coronavirus, and many more commonly known 
diseases which cause severe symptoms to fatality, but for which treatments exist. In the case of 
the NBAF, the possibility includes up to BSL 4 pathogens for which no cure exists or which 
experts consider extremely dangerous, regardless of the cure, including Ebola and Smallpox. 
Release of such a pathogen could have deadly pandemic consequences.  
The final threat Manhattan faces comes veiled in the security of having military forces 
less than 20 miles from the city limits making the area a target. Whiteman Air Force Base, home 
of the B-2 stealth bombers, stands less than 200 miles away. Their location in the middle of the 
country provides these facilities a degree of security, but does not make them invincible. While 
unlikely, Manhattan disaster planners must take into account the possibility of attack upon 
either of these high-profile military institutions. 
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Galveston, Texas 
The small vacation destination of Galveston, Texas stretches along the barrier island of 
Galveston Island and Pelican Island in the Gulf Coast, 50 miles southeast of Houston. Accessible 
by the Galveston-Bolivar Ferry from the Bolivar Peninsula on the northeast side, the island also 
has two other highway access points. Many tourists enjoy riding the ferry and feeding the 
seagulls while all riders, even daily commuters, enjoy the gulf sea breeze and watching for 
playful porpoises popping from the water. The ferry ride crosses the entry to the Houston ship 
channel and riders often see large freighters and tankers passing through, in addition to 
sailboats and commercial fishing boats. Tourism plays a large role in the economy for this city, 
along with healthcare and shipping. Tourism draws individuals to the six historic districts in the 
city, including the Strand shopping area and Moody Mansion. The University of Texas Medical 
Branch (UTMB) located on the island hosts 2,500 students and these become a large part of the 
economy. Additionally, Texas A&M University has a branch on Pelican Island where the “Sea 
Aggies” attend classes. The smaller island also houses a memorial to USS Seawolf, Seawolf Park, 
which houses three different preserved U.S. Navy Ships (Wikipedia, 2013). Another tourist draw 
to the city cruises in and out almost weekly: the Port of Galveston offers safe landing for cruise 
ships (Port of Galveston, n.d.).  Galveston currently holds the title of #1 cruise port on the Gulf 
Coast (Wikipedia, 2013). Beaches, restaurants and shops attract individuals from across the 
country to enjoy this barrier island, creating a draw to the city.  
While the rich history of Galveston Island attracts tourists, it also shines a light on some 
of the dangers of island living. The biggest historical disaster to the island struck on September 
8, 1900:  the Hurricane of 1900. The Galveston Hurricane remains the deadliest natural disaster 
to ever strike the United States with a death toll between 6,000 and 12,000—to put this 
number in perspective, consider the deadliest storm of recent times, Hurricane Katrina which 
claimed 1,800 lives (Wikipedia, 2013). At the time the biggest city in the state of Texas, the 
hurricane decimated the booming town of 37,000 residents. Amazingly, one weather ‘expert’ 
wrote in a local paper that “it would be impossible for a hurricane of significant strength to 
strike the island” (Wikipedia, 2013, p. 3). Emboldened by this brazen statement, developers cut-
10 
 
Figure 6: Hurricane Ike just before 
making landfall 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane_ike 
 
down sand dunes along the shore to fill low areas in the city, thus removing what little barrier 
the city had against the Gulf of Mexico.  This construction left the highest point in the city at 
only 8.7 feet above sea level. Then Mother Nature added in a storm surge of 15 feet, the result: 
6,000 dead, 30,000 homeless with over 3,600 homes destroyed, and $20 million in damages 
(Wikipedia, 2013). The hurricane brought maximum wind speeds estimated at 120 mph and 
barometric pressures so low, most considered the readings “obviously in error” (Wikipedia, 
2013, p. 5) though estimates eventually placed this hurricane as a Category 4 classification on 
the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale. 
Category Sustained Winds Types of Damage due to Hurricane Winds 
1 74-95 mph Very dangerous winds will produce some damage 
2 96-110 mph Extremely dangerous winds will cause extensive damage 
3 111-129 mph Devastating damage will occur 
4 130-156 mph Catastrophic damage will occur 
5 157 + mph Catastrophic damage will occur 
Table 2: Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale (NOAA/ National Weather Service, 2013) 
 
Another hurricane, this one in more recent history, hit Galveston Island; Hurricane Ike 
swept across the beaches on September 13, 2008 as a Category 2 storm 
with winds of 110 mph. These hurricane force winds extended 120 miles 
from the center (at one point, the storm stretched over 600 miles) and 
experts predicted the storm to make land-fall with wind speeds of a 
Category 2 storm, but with a storm surge of a Category 4 storm. In the 
aftermath of this storm (which eventually traveled all the way to Iceland), 
the region lost over 8,000 housing units, 3,459 families became homeless, 
and UTMB sustained significant damage (Wikipedia, 2013).  
While all disasters have far-reaching consequences, not all natural events affecting 
Galveston fall into the category of disasters. The region has many tectonic faults, and several of 
these active, but none produced significant earthquakes in recorded history (Wikipedia, 2013). 
Experts believe fault creep in the area keeps the tectonic plates in constant but seismically 
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negligible movement, thus reducing the risk of earthquakes. Not including hurricanes, the 
biggest risk to Galveston residents comes from local industries.  
Located in southeast Texas, Galveston residents live in one of the country’s highest oil 
producing areas. This includes on and off-shore drilling and many refineries on the mainland. 
The area faces dangers from industrial accidents, manufacturing explosions, and ship channel 
accidents. As with any city containing highways and railways, transportation accidents or spills 
also pose a threat. Additionally, Galveston Bay receives toxic chemicals from industrial 
discharge and pollutants washing in from the Houston Ship channel as well as storm run-off 
from commercial, agricultural and residential sources (Wikipedia, 2013). An example of both 
shipping and manufacturing accident occurred in 1947 when a ship carrying ammonium nitrate 
detonated in Texas City. The April 16th explosion forced Galvestonians 10 miles away to their 
knees and in the aftermath, an oily fog drifted over the island, eventually leaving deposits over 
every exposed outdoor surface (Wikipedia, 2013). More recently, another industrial accident 
rocked Texas City, this time in 2005 when the BP Texas City refinery experienced a hydrocarbon 
vapor cloud explosion. While this did not directly affect the island, many residents commute to 
the mainland and work either in Texas City or Houston, having to drive through Texas City. An 
even more recent example of a man-made accident occurred earlier in 2013 in West, Texas 
when a fertilizer plant exploded on April 7th. All of these incidents further enforce the dangers 
facing the Galveston area. The final threat comes from terrorism: since Galveston Bay opens 
into the Houston Bay and acts as one of the main thoroughfares for large ships, it poses as a 
prime target for interrupting commercial shipping. Additionally, UTMB contains a BSL 4 lab and 
thus invites the same possibilities for pathogen release and terrorism targeting as previously 
mentioned for Manhattan.  
These two towns have many different risks and those making plans for disasters need to 
recognize these. While it becomes tempting to limit one’s efforts and funds to making plans for 
the disaster of most-recent history, or the current “trend” in terrorism, each area should 
seriously assess their needs and vulnerabilities. Only once an area fully comprehends their 
vulnerabilities can they then start to understand and prepare plans.  
EF Scale Wind Speed 
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Figure 7: Dam Failure Warning System (URS Corps, n.d.) 
Manhattan, Kansas 
made changes to address 
some of their hazards. The 
largest undertaking in 
recent history, the 
reinforcement and 
strengthening of Tuttle 
Creek dam took nearly 8 years. The U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers installed anchors to solidify the dam (APNewsNow, 2009) as well as hiring an outside 
company to design, build and maintain a Dam Failure Warning System (DFWS). This includes 
instruments to detect seismic activity and dam deformation, a video surveillance system, a 
siren warning system and an evacuation plan (URS Corps, n.d.). To mitigate the risk of 
tornadoes, those living in tornado alley must plan ahead since they receive little warning of 
these unstoppable destructive freight trains. On June 11th of 2008, even though a tornado 
rating 4 on the Enhanced Fujita Scale barreled through Manhattan, leaving a wreckage of 45 
residences, two mobile homes and three businesses destroyed and significant damage to an 
elementary school and KSU, no residents died. This speaks to the resiliency and preparedness 
of those living in the region: they have plans and know where to go and what to do when the 
tornado sirens sound.  
The BRI, a newer hazard to Manhattan, still has a lot of residents spooked. Standing on 
the corner of KSU’s campus, this BSL-3 lab contains state-of-the-art security not only to limit 
human entry and exit but also to limit pathogen entry and exit. In the selection of the site for 
the future NBAF, authorities worried about placing the facility in Kansas due to hazards posed 
by tornadoes and many share this fear of tornado damage releasing a pathogen from the BRI. 
While it is possible for tornadoes to level houses, both the NBAF and BRI facilities were built 
much stronger, sturdier and secure. As for preventing manual release of pathogens, this falls in 
the same category of dangers from the airport: the city must simply increase security and 
screening.  
0 65-85 mph 
1 86-110 mph 
2 111-135 mph 
3 136-165 mph 
4 166-200 mph 
5 200+ mph 
Table 3: Enhanced Fujita Scale 
(The Weather Channel, 2012) 
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Figure 8: Building the Galveston Seawall, from the 1904 
Texas Almanac 
Figure 9: Lifted St. Patrick's Church (Intagliata, 2013) 
Galveston County actually has a very extensive hurricane preparedness plan and the 
plan’s breadth means it can accommodate almost any disaster they may face. Most weather 
enforcement efforts for Galveston City occurred in response to the devastation of the Hurricane 
of 1900, including building the seawall and raising the city.  
The Seawall, a structure that stretches for ten 
miles along the Gulf side of the island, stands 17 feet 
tall. The seawall “was built to protect the island from 
tidal surges and hurricane force winds” 
(Galveston.com & Company, Inc., 1994-2012)” and 
continues to stand to this day, now for over 100 
years. The original portion of the seawall started in 1902 and modifications and additions 
continued through the years. While the enormous undertaking of building the seawall consisted 
of “5,200 railway carloads of crushed granite, 1,800 carloads of sand, 1,000 carloads of cement, 
1,200 carloads of round wooden pilings, 4,000 carloads of wooden sheet pilings, 3,700 carloads 
of stone riprap and five carloads of reinforcing steel (Ramos, 1998-1999)” in the original 
section, it pales in comparison to raising the grade of the city. 
In December of 1903, work began on a 
project to raise the entire city to keep flooding at a 
minimum. According to the Texas State Historical 
Association, this project consisted of sectioning off 
the city into quarter-mile-square sections and 
enclosing this with a dike and then raising all 
structures and all utility lines including water, 
power, telegraph, and streetcar lines. This meant 
that leveler jacks raised over 2000 buildings, including the 3,000 ton St. Patrick’s Church, raised 
five feet by 700 jack screws (Ramos, 1998-1999). Workers reached the desired level by pumping 
sand dredged from the ocean to the different areas, allowing this to dry, then building 
foundations on the fill and finally attaching the buildings to their new bases. When completed 
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in 1910, 500 city blocks sat anywhere from a few inches to over 16 feet from their original 
footings by the use of 16.3 cubic yards of sand (Ramos, 1998-1999). The elevation change 
provided a chance to build a gradient into the island that did not exist before, correcting 
drainage and sewage problems; the area immediately behind the seawall sits at over 16.5 feet, 
giving the seawall a solid support and the gradient decreases by one foot for every 1,500 feet 
west to Galveston Bay. The hurricane of 1915 tested all these improvements, especially since 
experts considered this storm as strong as its predecessor in 1900. Even though waves battered 
the new seawall, those behind this barrier sustained little damage while the hurricane damaged 
90% of the buildings outside the protection of the seawall. Even so, only 8 fatalities resulted 
due to the improved drainage and city protection provided by the increased elevation. 
These examples of disaster mitigation plans for both Manhattan and Galveston highlight 
vulnerabilities and the need for proper planning. The next section will look more in-depth into 
the post-disaster recovery plans in place at the Galveston County Health District.   
Galveston County Health District: Organization and Opportunities 
The Galveston County Health District (GCHD) collaborates its efforts with other 
municipalities, making it more than a health department. The main areas of service in the 
Health District include: Air and Water Pollution; Consumer Health; Epidemiology; Animal 
Services; Community Outreach; Coastal Health and Wellness Clinic; Galveston Area Ambulance 
Authority; Immunizations; Public Information; Public Health Emergency Preparedness; Public 
Health Laboratory; Senior Health; Sexually Transmitted Disease (STD/HIV); Tuberculosis 
Services; Vital Statistics; and Women, Infants and Children (WIC). While I spent most of my time 
with the Public Health Emergency Preparedness staff, I also spent time observing function in 
other areas of the health district. A general purpose clinic whose services include medical and 
dental care, the Coastal Health and Wellness Clinic offers discounted services available on a 
sliding income based scale. One of my mentors works in the indigent care program and I found 
it interesting to see how this process works. I also spent time in Animal Services both at the 
animal shelter and with the animal control officers observing function and general practices. I 
spent a lot of time working with the epidemiologists as well. This department investigates 
diseases and outbreaks and while there, I assisted in investigating a pool Norovirus outbreak 
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among children. The pool investigation also involved Consumer Health Inspectors who inspect 
swimming pools as well as food service establishments, private sewage facilities and private 
water wells.  
CHAPTER 2: Disaster Preparedness 
A hot topic among government organizations since the September 11th attacks in 2001, 
disaster preparedness sent companies scrambling to form plans for response in case of terrorist 
attacks. With busy hurricane seasons like that of 2005 and massive storms like Sandy, coastal 
response also focuses on natural disasters. Tornadoes like those that struck Oklahoma in May 
of 2013 keeps those in the heartland of the country on their toes as well.  
Even cities not directly affected by the disasters may still need preparedness plans. In 
2005, Omaha, Nebraska hosted 166 victims displaced by hurricane Katrina. Of these evacuees, 
“about 15% … had acute injuries, including lacerations, fractures, abrasions, and infected insect 
bites” (Young, 2006, p. 299). One of the evacuees had an untreated snake bite. While Omaha 
does not plan to deal with hurricane winds, debris, and water, they still responded when 
needed. The Nebraskans also coordinated medication for the evacuees because about 45% had 
preexisting illnesses but had gone without their medications for more than 10 days (Young, 
2006). The local Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) physicians and pharmacists partnered with 
Walgreens to procure medications for the evacuees.  
Media 
In the case of a disaster with necessary public health intervention, two reasons for 
public communication exist: first, inform them of the situation so that they may take steps to 
keep their family safe, and second so that they do not panic. The media have a controversial 
power and task before them in disasters. Those in public health consider the media as a 
necessary evil, while journalists consider themselves the “watchdogs” of governmental actions. 
Those in the public health profession become torn between their need to educate the 
general public and their duty to protect the rights of their patients during a very vulnerable 
time. While photographs and other outlets may “help in organizing a quick response from the 
rest of the world,” according to Anant Bhan in an essay published about health professionals 
allowing reporters inside hospitals and clinics at times of natural disasters, “there has been little 
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consideration to date of the ethics of health-care staff allowing access to media inside medical 
institutions at times of natural disasters (Bhan, 2005, p. 0417).” This fine-line the physicians 
must tread ensures that they maintain a balance between making the experience more salient 
to the public (Paek, 2010) while protecting patients.  
In a recent article published by  a reporter about his first-hand experience in 
the devastation after the Moore, Oklahoma tornadoes, Alex Hannaford states 
that: “in two days I'd witnessed some fairly questionable behavior by some 
segments of the media in Moore: tabloid reporters sent solely to have their 
pictures taken amid the rubble to show their readers they were there; a news 
crew interviewing children who had lost a teacher, repeatedly asking “How 
did you feel?” in an attempt, presumably, to elicit tears. It left in bad taste, 
and I wondered whether this kind of “reporting” can impact those trying to 
tell the same story both ethically and sensitively. Was it any wonder I got the 
feeling we'd outstayed our welcome” (Hannaford, 2013)? 
 
On the other side of the argument, “journalists aim to inform the public about 
health risks, but they feel obligated to go beyond passive dissemination of 
information. Journalists may adopt a wary and even skeptical stance 
regarding government health agencies and spokespersons.”  
(Lowrey & et al, 2007, p. 3). 
Some argue that fault does not fall on the journalists themselves because they do not 
have sufficient background in medicine and science. This leads to the journalists possibly not 
fully understanding a position and getting into a situation where “journalists may mistake 
experts’ typically cautious and hedging language about health-related emergencies as evidence 
of stonewalling or incompetence, and that journalists too eagerly seek sources—sometimes 
less reputable sources—who will speak with relatively less caution” (Lowrey & et al, 2007, p. 5). 
Either way, whether intentional or not, this kind of coverage may cause the general public to 
become wary of the efforts made by public health officials and may induce more panic. In 
Hannaford’s account, he gives the example that while in Moore and trying to cover the story, 
police confined all the journalists to a media area outside a shopping center where police 
limited their interviewing rights to only first responders. When Hannaford ventured outside this 
area and found a couple retrieving what memories they could from the rubble that used to be 
their home who agreed to talk with him and give him an interview this was interrupted by a 
17 
 
police officer. When the journalist asked to spend a few more minutes with his willing 
interviewees, the officer responded with: “If you don't leave now, I'll arrest you. These people 
have lost everything and they don't want to speak to you” (Hannaford, 2013). 
But where does the solution lie? Should the physicians and other health-care 
professionals take responsibility for policing journalists, possibly swarming around looking for 
the next front-page image—or even worse, a headline to gather funds? Should medical facilities 
completely shut-out journalists during a public health emergency? Can these two reach a truce? 
Yes! The respite comes in the form of the Public Information Officer (PIO). This individual 
becomes the go-between for the journalists and the experts, having knowledge about the 
resources in the facility and knowing the right person to answer a specific question. To help 
protect patients’ rights, journalists take no pictures and conduct no interviews without going 
through the PIO first. This allows the health care workers to focus on their lifesaving measures 
first, and the media second but still allows the message to get out to the public. Finally, 
journalists, community leaders, health departments, and medical humanitarian agencies such 
as the Red Cross should meet to form guidelines for ethical reporting of disasters. Bhan goes as 
far as to suggest that “perhaps only journalists who have been accredited … should be given 
access to disaster sites” (p. 0472). In the end, all must focus on the big picture: “media … have 
important roles to play in informing the public about disaster risks and about the state of 
preparedness capabilities” (Irwin Redlener, 2006, p. 101). 
During a planning meeting for a disaster full-scale exercise held at GCHD, professionals 
debated the need to add a PIO into the exercise and practice media communication but in the 
end pinned this as unnecessary. However, experts in the field argue that involving media even 
in training allows them to feel involved and establishes more open lines of communication. This 
also provides an opportunity to practice disaster communication. Finally, the media can inform 
the public that their local health authorities practice preparedness drills to stay ready.  
In the case of Hannaford and other journalists who may want more than just the story 
from a first responder’s point of view, Hannaford offers one last bit of advice, “despite the 
feeling in the immediate aftermath of a tragedy that you should get in quickly, tell the story and 
get out, we need to continue to report stories as long as there are stories to tell” (Hannaford, 
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2013). He continues with offering that if reporters, survivors and other interviewees tire of 
telling/ hearing the same old story or simply reliving the tragedy, then it’s time for the 
journalists to come at the story from a different angle.  
Point of Dispensing (POD) 
A Point of Dispensing (POD) site sets up to mass-dispense medication to the public in a 
time of need. These may also dispense medications like ciprofloxacin in the case of a 
bioterrorism attack like release of Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) release in a bioterrorism attack. 
For a natural disaster such as a hurricane, a POD may provide first-responders and those 
returning tetanus vaccines. Even in day-to-day public health use, a POD could dispense flu 
vaccines in case of an epidemic like that seen with H1N1. “Many communities activated their 
bioterrorism vaccine dissemination plans to distribute flu vaccine in 2005, using relationships 
among public health agencies, the medical community, and organizations such as the Red 
Cross” (Katz, Staiti, & McKenzie, 2006, p. 950). 
Most PODs receive medications through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) and Homeland Security from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Made of two types of 
stocks, the SNS contains medical supplies and medications. Ready to send to an area in need 
within 24 hours of request, “push packages” contain non-specific medications, supplies, and 
broad-spectrum medications. These help with the initial contact, hopefully containing the 
beginning illness. Storing the push packs in secure, strategic locations makes them more 
accessible across the country faster. The second stock of medication, called the Managed 
Inventory (MI), makes up most of the SNS. Upon confirmation of diagnosis and establishment of 
need, the CDC releases specific drugs like small pox vaccines.   
Once a disaster hits and local authorities establish the need for public medication, 
volunteers and public health professionals deploy to set up PODs. In the case of deployment by 
GCHD, the volunteers receive calls, emails, or text messages to get the POD sites prepared and 
set up with the supplies in the POD boxes. GCHD supplies the POD boxes in a set of four to each 
site: a trunk with 4 drawers, a stackable POD box, a Refrigerator Box with a 3.3 cubic foot 
refrigerator and 3 drawers in addition to in-lid storage, and a Large US POD box with the same 
type of in-lid storage and 3 drawers. Each box has a specific focus so that they have specific 
stations instead of simply acting as storage centers. The Trunk, packed as the office supplies 
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station, has drawers packed with pre-loaded staplers (to allow for readiness in deployment), 
scissors, pens, clipboards, flashlights, and other general office supplies. The Refrigerator Box 
has an extension cord for the refrigerator which also has a thermometer to ensure that it 
reaches electricity and stays at a safe temperature for vaccines or medications enclosed. The 
drawers with the refrigerator contain other first-aid supplies such as gauze sponges, tissues, 
hand sanitizer, respirators, table drapes, cotton balls, biosharps containers, and extra nitrile 
gloves. This box works as a medical station, including the in-lid storage of gloves, Band-Aids and 
hand sanitizer. The Large US POD Box also has similar in-lid storage with Band-Aids, hand 
sanitizer and alcohol wipes. The drawers hold more medical supplies such as protective glasses, 
digital oral thermometer with probe covers, more gauze sponges and nitrile gloves, and a first-
aid kit. The Stackable US POD Box acts as a storage box for extra supplies like cases of Nitrile 
gloves and gallon jugs of hand sanitizer. The Stackable Box also works well for storage and 
transport of large items such as soft-sided coolers, POD signage, traffic directing flashlight 
wands and a printer. Because of its multipurpose function, the box functions not only as extra 
storage and large item storage, but also as a general function supplies box for items such as 
flashlights, radios, caution tape, a bull horn, and rope. Each box also contains a laminated 
inventory list of the complete box set (attached in Appendix C). When staff need to restock 
supplies, they will know where to find what they need. Also, the Large US POD Box and the 
Refrigerator Box fronts remove to access the drawers and then can set-up as tables. However, 
the POD site provides most tables.  
Usually located in high schools or community colleges, the sites selected require public 
familiarity and good access. GCHD’s POD plan sets up in school gymnasiums lending to high 
community familiarity and accessible parking. The POD site provides facilities such as restrooms 
as well as having maintenance personnel on site if needed. Appendix D contains an example of 
a site-specific POD map. In the case of utilities failure, Jack Ellison, Public Health Emergency 
Planner for GCHD said that portable restroom facilities get delivered and other relief 
organizations such as the National Guard or Red Cross provide drinkable water.  
The actual layout for the dispensing part of the POD generally stays the same regardless 
of the need, but the registration and security needs may differ depending on the reason for 
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POD deployment. In the case of a bioterrorism attack, a POD poses as a possible secondary 
target and therefore needs more security: separation of the assembly point and the POD may 
become necessary (Lee, Maheshwary, Mason, & Glisson, 2006). Natural disasters and natural 
outbreaks usually necessitate only one location. This cuts down on time for the public utilizing 
this opportunity and manpower needed. The research done on time and manpower needed for 
these different set-ups used a computerized Decision Support System (DSS) called RealOpt, 
described in Lee and Maheshwary’s paper. According to their calculations, the combined model 
uses 65% to 76% of the assigned staff needed for the separated model.   
POD Function 
According to Mr. Ellison, “the main goal at a POD is to get them through as fast as 
possible.” Even if the processing and dispensing process takes a long time, as long as lines still 
move, those in line feel like they progress and remain hopeful. In a training exercise conducted 
by Public Health of Seattle and King County (PHSKC), they accomplished continuity of flow by 
having participants stop to fill out their paperwork before entering the dispensing and 
processing part of the POD (Stergachis & Wetmore, 2007). This allowed individuals with 
difficulties reading or processing the requests on the forms to take their time without causing a 
bottleneck in the triage or dispensing process. The setup of PODs differ, depending on the 
source accessed.  The PHSKC drill consisted of four stations: (1) filing out the form, (2) showing 
the form, (3) picking up the medication, and (4) turning in the form. This seemed to cause 
shorter total throughput times but the data comes from a drill scenario; in a real situation, the 
confusion and/or panic may cancel the expedience of the process. Generally, the need for 
triage, admission or processing, lines with line control stations, medication dispensing and final 
processing with education helps ease stress and anxiety. Some situations may call for additional 
assistance through security, psychological evaluation/ assistance, medical assistance, and 
question stations. Those only picking up medication for adults and do not need any special 
assistance due to drug interactions, special medical needs, or different dose calculations for 
pediatric dosages allow for an express dispensing option, a common trend in POD planning. 
According to Lee et al., eight primary activities exist in the dispensing process: (1) Assembly/ 
Intake, (2) Triage, (3) Orientation, (4) Registration, (5) Screening, (6) Service, (7) Education, and 
(8) Discharge.  
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Figure 10: POD set up and flow original artwork by Iris Smithey 
and Richard Wayne Pierce 
Assembly/ Intake 
Public service announcements on radio or other media outlets invite the public to 
assemble at predetermined point(s) across the area. These announcements notify the public 
that only the head of household needs to come to the POD. According to the Philadelphia 
Department of Public Health (PDPH) Medical Center (POD) Operations Manual, the Head of 
Household Model means that “the Head of Household can obtain medication for all household 
members, so children, elderly, and special populations 
do not all have to come to the Medication Center 
(POD)” (pg. 1). In the case of a single point-source 
disaster such as a release of anthrax in a shopping mall, 
those affected assemble at a certain point. In contrast, 
in a wide-spread disaster such as a natural disaster, the 
government will establish multiple assembly points 
throughout the region. In the case of a bioterrorism 
attack, the actual PODs and medication would need 
protection meaning separation of the assembly point 
and the dispensing area. According to Lee, et al., “a 
tight security check would be performed by law 
enforcement or military personal at a separate site (the 
Assembly Point) and all cleared clients would then be 
bused to the POD” (pg. 38). Mr. Ellison expressed 
concern because this method, with volunteers on the 
busses to answer questions during the drive, would put volunteers in harm’s way in confined 
spaces.  
A remote assembly point has three main blocks: active triage, medical evaluation, and 
mental health evaluation. Since remote assembly implies a need for additional security, all of 
these blocks follow the initial security check-in. The active triage station staff engages clients 
and asks if they have any questions. A very small percent of clients get directed to the medical 
evaluation or mental health evaluation at the assembly point. At this point, medical evaluation 
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Epidemiologists Wanted 
The reason for epidemiologists in disaster 
preparedness may not be as apparent as, say an 
evacuation plan and medication stockpiles, but they 
do play a key role in planning and keeping the 
community safe during an event. “Hiring 
epidemiologists and statisticians … improved 
disease surveillance” for the Florida Department of 
Health (Katz, Staiti, & McKenzie, 2006) because it 
allowed them to integrate surveillance systems and 
have a centralized database. During a disaster, their 
skills may be important to track disease trends and 
outbreaks or possibly to simply be on-hand to 
answer questions about diseases because they will 
have more knowledge of the disease situation than 
most first-responders.   
 
services those needing medical assistance for acute illness on-site or other emergent medical 
needs. Mental health evaluation aids those clients showing obvious signs of heightened anxiety 
to the point where they may interrupt flow and become dangerous to themselves or others. 
Lee, et al. anticipated that 95% would continue onto the busses to progress to the POD.  
At the assembly point, clients receive medical history forms to fill out during processing. 
Completion of forms may occur while waiting in lines or during the bussing process, depending 
on the situation. Intake greeters help guide clients toward the right path and progressively 
check the medical forms for legibility, correctness and completeness.  
Triage 
Medical professionals such as nurses, 
emergency medical services personnel, physicians, 
physicians’ assistants, and mental health counselors 
staff the triage station. The PODs could potentially 
become a hot-spot for disease incubation due to the 
major throughput for public processing; those at triage 
stations must practice diligence to recognize early 
symptoms. Even with a triage station, all volunteers 
and assistants throughout the POD should observe 
patients meticulously as they process them.  
The triage staff process all incoming clients into three groups: sick, the worried well, and 
apparently healthy. Medical personnel assess sick clients’ condition in a sick area to determine 
if they need to transport him/her to a medical facility. In the case of a contagious disease, staff 
sort patients into those showing symptoms, those exposed but not yet symptomatic, and those 
with no known exposure. In this case, those showing symptoms fall into the category of “sick” 
and therefore ineligible for vaccination while the other two remain eligible for vaccination. 
Notification goes out to an epidemiology liaison if medical staff suspect a case of the disease of 
interest. The distressed clients, overwhelmed by the situation, experiencing a high degree of 
anxiety, receive assistance from mental health services. This maintains flow in the POD and 
makes sure that such individuals do not cause an overall air of panic. As expected, “major 
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disasters are typically major sources of trauma” (Melton & Sianko, 2010, p. 538). The next 
group of clients—those with no obvious symptoms—continue to the next step in the process.  
Admission/ Orientation 
POD plans mainly differ at this point. Many have the next station as an admission table 
where the head-of-household receives paperwork (attached to a clipboard) to fill this out for all 
individuals in their care. Others have an orientation area where clients stop in small groups to 
receive a short briefing on the situation and organization within the POD.  
Admission 
In the admission model, workers can answer basic questions about filling out papers. 
Certain regions may require bilingual individuals as well as signs directing line flow and station 
labels in multiple languages. One of the studies cited in the Lee article stated that “the use of 
multi-language signs proved to be very helpful, overcoming the overwhelming delays and chaos 
due to language problems” (pg. 43). 
Set-up as a long set of tables parallel to line-flow, volunteers direct individuals to the 
next open station to pick up their forms. Clients then move to the next open queue to wait for 
dispensing. If running a disjoint model, placing admission/ forms dispensing at the separate 
assembly point allows clients more time to look over the paperwork.  While waiting in line for 
dispensing, the client will fill out the paperwork assisted by the knowledgeable line control 
staff.  
A key position, line control may seem like a simple and dispensable position. These 
individuals keep the line moving, identify bottle-necks in flow, and answer questions about 
forms while individuals move through lines. GCHD allows for an express line for those with 
physical ailments that make it difficult for them to stand in line for extended periods of time.  
Orientation 
In the orientation model, all clients stop in the flow for a brief orientation where 
“general information will be presented regarding the situation, prophylaxis and/or treatment, 
common adverse effects, and instructions for competing the regimen” (pg. 29). The orientation 
staff also presents hand-outs with information reinforcing the orientation presentation. These 
sessions possibly include educational videos and presentations to groups of 25-30, depending 
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Figure 11: Generic POD Layout design for GCHD  
Original artwork by Iris Smithey 
on the flow and processing time of the POD. Running concurrent sessions helps expedite the 
process as well.  
Tandem 
Not mutually exclusive, these two ideas of how clients could begin their POD experience 
may also run in tandem. Clients would receive paperwork at the admission table and then 
progress to orientation groups. The groups gather and then receive information before moving 
on to the next step. Orientation can also function as a stop-gate to control the line-flow to 
registration making sure 
progress through the POD 
does not get overwhelmed. 
This feeds into the illusion 
that line flow has not 
stopped as long as 
orientation representatives 
remain available for 
questions. The orientation 
presenter can tailor his or 
her program to fit the needs 
of the line flow.  GCHD 
integrates their orientation 
into the line flow by posting large signs along line progression. According to Mr. Ellison, this 
works similar to orientation because it includes televisions with videos on continuous loops.  
Registration 
At the registration table, clients sign a numbered log sheet allowing staff to count total 
throughput. At this time, patients also sign a consent form and complete any remaining forms. 
Staff check forms for completeness and legibility then direct clients to keep the forms in their 
possession and present them at all remaining stations.   
Screening  
Screeners complete a more thorough review of forms, looking for any possible 
problems; senior screeners help those with contraindications or more complex health histories. 
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Screeners interview clients and discuss services appropriate for each individual client and 
reinforce the fact sheet with frequently asked questions. z 
Dispensing Service Area 
According to the PDPH POD manual, “each POD should have one pharmacist 
(Medication Dispensing Supervisor) to oversee dispensing activities” (pg. 13). If using express 
medication dispensing, this line speeds along individuals receiving only adult dosages of the 
medication. All others go to the medication dispensing area where, depending on the 
processing within the POD, staff may sort clients by their needs. An exercise run by Seattle and 
King County in Washington State used color-coded dispensing lines. “There were three color-
coded dispensing lines: green (express adult standard dosage), blue (for anyone who needed to 
pick up pediatric suspensions), and orange (for anyone who needed dosage adjustments due to 
contraindications or other medical conditions or additional counseling with a pharmacist and 
for patients with disabilities or special communication or interpreting needs)” (Stergachis & 
Wetmore, 2007, p. 287). Staff work in pairs when vaccinating. A vaccinator checks the form, 
determines which vaccine and dose to administer, signs the screening form, and administers 
the vaccine while an assistant to draws up the vaccine, completes needed paperwork, and 
directs the client to contact their personal medical provider for additional information 
(Philadelphia Department of Public Health, 2008). When dispensing pills as medication, the 
teams stay together, one as a pill counter and the other working as the face to talk with clients 
and dispense medications. After receiving vaccination or medication, the clients continue to the 
education area.  
Education Area 
The education area’s purpose covers two goals: to help reinforce messages the clients 
previously received and to observe patients for possible side-effects. While delivering last-
minute reinforcement information and answering questions, educators watch for potential 
adverse reactions. In the case of a reaction, staff quickly move the patient to the sick area, and 
stabilizes them if needed. If indicated, the patient gets transported to an appropriate medical 
care facility. Reviewing the Frequently Asked Questions handout and the drug Fact Sheet 
accomplishes the educational goal of this station. The Seattle and King County Public Health 
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(PHSKC) agency also distributed “wallet cards, which contained contact information for PHSKC, 
Washington State department of health, and CDC hotlines and websites (pg. 287).” 
Discharge Area 
The discharge area is a final forms collection area where the staff reviews forms for 
completion and legibility and collects all forms for retrieval by logistics runners. These 
eventually enter a data entry program for analysis. The clipboards collected at this point remain 
in circulation via runners.  
Volunteer Force 
This process requires a lot of man-power to run smoothly. While public health 
professionals play key roles in these situations, they cannot fill all stations. Most areas can 
recruit health department employees to the cause, but this still only fills a small percent of the 
positions needed for the POD. The majority of positions need volunteers to fill necessary staff 
positions. Only a few positions require medical licenses, the majority of positions simply require 
an individual with a willing spirit. Jobs like greeter, line control, or data entry do not require 
much physical exertion and therefore individuals not in prime physical condition could fill these 
positions. At GCHD, they figured that each POD would need 42 individuals per shift which 
makes for a total of over one-thousand individuals among their 12 POD sites. The staff of 
volunteers and professionals alternate on 12 hour shifts until they dispense all medication—
hopefully meeting the goal to have this completed in 48 hours.  
While at GCHD, I participated in their volunteer recruitment drive. This included 
attending many educational community organization meetings, including presentations about 
the health district and the opportunities for health care offered.  To recruit volunteers for the 
Galveston County Medical Reserve Corps (MRC), we educated them about the MRC and what 
we do for the community. The volunteer recruitment coordinator was only responsible for 
making contact with organizations such as Lion’s Clubs, Kiwanis Clubs and Police Academies to 
set up opportunities for us to make presentations. We also presented to larger businesses to 
recruit some of their employees and targeted medical personnel through meetings at local 
hospitals. In my 6 weeks with the health district, the volunteer force grew from 180 to 1680.  
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Training and Retention 
We also began building a volunteer training and retention program with the goal to get 
ready to respond to a disaster. As previously stated, most positions do not require specialized 
training, but a familiarity with specifics of communication during a disaster and knowledge of 
the flow of command helps.  
In the feedback questionnaire from the training conducted during my internship, the 
volunteers requested more trainings and involvement opportunities (summary of results from 
the feedback questionnaire attached in Appendix E). Those involved in MRCs have many 
different training prospects. MRCs should provide some and consider them necessary for all 
members, while some trainings target those with more drive. Volunteers should also consider 
different trainings and opportunities offered through other community organizations. 
The first MRC orientation welcomes new members, gets everyone oriented, and makes 
sure all volunteers have a handbook and official name badge. Available online, sample 
handbooks with name badge designs provide outlines to make sure one’s handbook covers all 
essential topics. The orientation also offers an opportunity to answer any questions volunteers 
may have. The training should also introduce the Incident Command System (ICS). The 
minimum courses for all volunteers include IS 100 and IS 700. Other trainings that all members 
should attend include a First Aid and CPR course and a Psychological First Aid course. 
Volunteers can take the courses individually the MRC could set up to have them presented to 
the group to promote teamwork and a feeling of community. The MRC could also provide 
online courses in the diseases that they may respond to as well as an introduction to 
epidemiology and what goes into disease tracking and management. Additionally, for a POD 
Manager Certification, individuals should attend additional courses such as FEMA’s SNS 
introduction and the more advanced ICS training courses. In the study conducted by Lutz and 
Lindell when reviewing use of the Incident Command System (ICS) during Hurricane Rita, they 
concluded that “ICS implementation in TEXAS EOCs [Emergency Operation Centers] during 
Hurricane Rita left much to be desired (pg. 132).”  Further, the study suggests that “ICS, as 
currently designed and trained, does not generalize well to all types of organizations 
responding to all types of hazards (Lutz & Lindell, 2008, p. 132).” The authors go further and 
state that the problem lies in the ICS training platform. One respondent to the Hurricane Rita 
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survey stated that “I am not familiar with ICS in a practical sense. I have been involved in 
training but they are very dry (pg. 135).” This participant speaks to an MRC’s need to engage 
their participants.  
While book knowledge and lessons help, planned preparedness exercises provide 
invaluable hands-on experience. According to Katz and Staiti, these “test such capabilities as 
emergency communication systems, vaccine distribution, and command-and-control structures 
(pg. 950).” With the current popularity of shows such as “The Walking Dead” and movie series 
like “Resident Evil,” the professionals at GCHD joked about using a zombie attack as a mock-
deployment exercise, using candies for the “pills” and to even go all the way through a 
complete volunteer call-down and POD deployment. Such an exercise allows everyone to 
practice what they learned in courses such as IS 100 and also allows the professionals to see 
where they still have gaps in the training regimen. “Drills and exercises with the many players 
that make up a municipality’s first-response teams, as well as citizens and nongovernmental 
organizations, are critical to assess the extent of a locality’s reliable, functioning capabilities to 
identify gaps, and to take concrete steps to fill those gaps (Irwin Redlener, 2006, p. 102).” 
Incident Command System (ICS) 
Disaster response always requires multiple emergency response agencies to work 
together. However, first responders do not always communicate on the same wavelength. 
Unfortunately, the disaster in New York on September 11, 2001 showcased this weakness. 
“Police officers on the ground could not communicate with the firefighters who were in the 
higher floors of the World Trade Center in order to warn them to evacuate the buildings. … The 
loss of 343 firefighters on Sept 11 [was] due to the simple fact that police and firefighters did 
not have interoperable communications devices” (Bersch, 2010). Two keys to solving this 
problem include the Incident Command System and the Emergency Operations Center.   
The Incident Command System initially began in response to deficient communication, 
coordination and management in responding to California wildfires in 1970 (Davies, Deric, & 
Davies, 2005). By 1982, the National Interagency Incident Management System adopted the 
system for use by police and other fire/rescue systems. More recently, “flaws in the response to 
the World Trade Center terrorist attacks led to the development of the National Incident 
Management System ICS (NIMS ICS), which must be adopted by any state or local jurisdiction 
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Figure 12: Large Agency ICS Example, from Hawaii Department of Public Health 
(Claimont, 2005) 
receiving financial support from 
the federal government” (Lutz & 
Lindell, 2008, p. 123). NIMS 
provides a proactive approach for 
organizations to work together to 
“prevent, protect against, 
respond to, recover from, and 
mitigate the effects of incidents, 
regardless of cause, size, location, 
or complexity, in order to reduce 
the loss of life and property and 
harm to the environment” (FEMA, 
2012, p. 2). 
The ICS provides a framework for crisis response that centralizes authority to an incident 
commander to direct the emergency and all the organizations taking part in the response. 
Management systems are organized in four main areas: planning, operations, logistics, and 
administration/ finance. ICS became so wide-spread that schools adopted the program so that 
emergency response personnel and school personnel can talk using a common language in a 
time of need (Barnes, 2011, p. 18). All staff members respond to only one supervisor and that 
supervisor only watches over a few individuals. The ICS 100 training notes recommend a ratio 
of one supervisor to five subordinates; this keeps the chain of command manageable and 
orderly.  
Unified Command: the Incident Commander 
ICS unifies command in a disaster or other situation. This means that all the different 
organizations and departments responding to a disaster would all fall under one incident 
command system and structure; one incident commander (IC) takes charge of the entire event 
response. Instead of the policemen acting as one unit, the firefighters as a different entity, and 
the EMS or other health care professionals as yet another, one umbrella encompasses them all. 
“A unified command is expected to foster the development of a single and common set of goals 
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and strategies, facilitate coordination and the flow of information, clarify responsibilities and 
restrictions for each actor, and optimize network effectiveness (Moynihan, 2008, p. 207).” 
While the police department still works independently from the fire department, these two 
response efforts work within the ICS to coordinate the effort and make sure duplication of tasks 
does not occur. The two highly specialized groups, utilized for their knowledge and skills, work 
within one of the four components of ICS: operations, logistics, planning, or finance and 
administration. Within the unified command system, every incident should have an Incident 
Action Plan (IAP) which gives specific objectives, activities, and operational time frame. In most 
emergency situations, the Incident Commander, stationed at the Incident Command Post (ICP), 
can oversee all incident operations. The city’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) houses the 
ICP in most situations.  
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 
A central command facility, the EOC carries out emergency preparedness and 
emergency or disaster management functions at a strategic level. Most communications within 
the ICS go through this secure location in a disaster. During my internship, I observed a 
hurricane response training including activation of the county’s EOC. The EOC became the 
headquarters for liaisons from the different organizations responsible for coordinating a 
response during a hurricane: the health district, EMS, police and fire departments, road and 
bridge maintenance, the Coast Guard, as well as many other city and county groups that I did 
not recognize. All activities coordinated through a program called WebEOC where each group 
watched the real-time action reports from the field as the participants provided input. 
Participants entered either reports from the field that needed action or members at the EOC 
could enter actions taken to fix situations in the field. Many of the key-players in a disaster 
response also have this program on their telephones to enable them to use it while in the field. 
Traffic cameras gave live feeds into the room on multiple monitors to keep track of evacuation 
efforts and any other issues. According to Mr. Ellison, the EOC receives requests from the field 
for supplies they use up. He mentioned that a lot of cross-talk between the different 
organizations helps each other out. He said that for hurricane Ike, they all arrived to their 
stations before the storm hit. For the most part, participants just rode-out the storm and 
monitored the aftermath until about four to five days after the storm made land-fall. Then they 
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Figure 13: Galveston County Emergency Management Facility 
Invalid source specified. 
dealt with calls for more supplies and assistance needed, especially as the public returned to 
their homes. While tools like ICS and equipment in POD boxes are invaluable in a disaster, they 
are useless without the proper prior planning in place. 
CHAPTER 3: Field Experience 
I started my field experience on May 20th, 2013 with the following objectives:  
 Apply lessons from course work in epidemiology and other courses to gain real-world 
experience in the health field. 
 Work with professionals in the field and recruiting volunteers, and learn how to recruit, 
educate and lead volunteers in a public health emergency. 
 Learn procedures involved in disaster preparedness. 
 Attend and partially coordinate a 3-day exercise and hurricane preparedness training 
with POD activation.  
 Develop and write an orientation and training program for public health volunteers 
developing a public health disaster relief program involving POD deployment. 
Storm Preparedness Drill 
The 3-day Storm Preparedness Drill, began on May 29th, involving Hurricane Gaviota 
making landfall in San Luis Pass. The imaginary storm struck as a major hurricane, causing 
evacuation of Galveston County. The first 
day was spent at the county Emergency 
Operations Center in Dickinson, Texas. Over 
100 participants made decisions and took 
actions based on unfolding situations and 
roles (Police News, 2013). The exercise 
controllers communicated dozens of 
scenarios and requests to the players to test their handling of adverse situations. In an 
interview with a local television station, one of the experts likened this drill to a football team 
practicing: you would not want them to take the field without prior practice and that’s just 
what the professionals were doing at this time.  
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I sat-in as a volunteer with a representative from the Galveston County Health District: 
Jack Ellison, the Public Health Emergency Planner. Inside, the facility houses a large control 
room where row after row of computers are set up on tables along with phones at the different 
stations for each represented organization. At each station, individuals monitored the situation 
via a computer program called WebEOC where different first responders either input updates 
about the situation as they came in: “There is a group of residents hunkering down in Fort 
Travis refusing to evacuate.” As these updates came up on the screen, the responders then 
took the appropriate action from the command post to deal with situations as they unfold: 
“The Sheriff’s department is sending over a deputy to disperse the crowd.” Other organizations 
can also post their input or assistance: “The parks department is sending two busses to assist in 
transporting the group to shelters.” Those in the field can also keep in touch with the EOC to 
update the situation via mobile WebEOC on their phones: “The deputy arrived and reported 
that there is some kind of disease outbreak and many of the group are ill with an 
indeterminable illness.” Appropriate response can then be taken from the command center: 
“EMS is dispatching 2 ambulances to assess the situation.”  
Many organizations participated in this exercise and in the late morning, a conference 
call gave everyone an update on the weather conditions and general evacuation status of the 
area. It was interesting to see how an evacuation is run from the inside because they start from 
the most southern point and evacuate cities and counties slowly progressing northward. I 
originally thought this was solely because the storm moves from south to north and they 
wanted to get the people out of the most danger the fastest but that’s not the only incentive: 
they emphasized the point that they wanted to make sure everyone evacuated the southern 
counties and gave them ample time before evacuating Houston because once Houston is given 
the mandatory evacuation order the northbound roadways become completely grid-locked, 
trapping anyone south of that area. In talking with someone who went through hurricane 
evacuations, she said that she still has panic attacks when stopped in traffic because she feels 
like she is trapped just as she was during the hurricanes: at that time, she was trapped in traffic 
and could not go anywhere, just sitting and waiting for the storm to arrive.  
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Figure 14: Site-specific map for POD deployment, larger 
image can be found in Appendix D 
As the Public Health and Galveston County Health District representative, our part was 
to watch for any messages along the lines of “we have run out of ‘X’ medication and need 
assistance.” We would then run the message up the appropriate lines to request assistance 
from the Strategic National Stockpile. If mass public medication dispensing were necessary, we 
would also set up a Point of Dispensing to accomplish such a task. As part of this drill, we set up 
a Point of Dispensing (POD) on the second day and involved volunteers from the local Medical 
Reserve Corps as part of the training.  
Point of Dispensing Deployment Training 
The second day, GCHD prepared for and led a POD deployment training at a local 
college. In preparation for this meeting, I spent many hours researching the background and 
general set-up for PODs, including constructing a general POD map to fit with my mentor’s 
vision of POD function and flow and then adapting this map to fit the college’s gymnasium. 
These images both became part of the participant information packet that all volunteers 
received.  Other items that I put together into 
these packets included: outline of activities, 
general notes, job descriptions for a mass 
vaccination clinic, a sample patient history form, 
and a participant feedback survey. I also 
constructed an agenda for the professionals 
leading the training, including target times for 
each event and brief notes with speaking points 
to insure certain ideas got covered (attached in 
Appendix F). In the hours before the training, I 
printed and assembled the packets, went to the 
warehouse and assembled backpacks of goodies 
for the volunteers, and tried to coordinate the 
professionals on how the presentation would run. Packing the backpacks meant climbing up 
and down ladders and shelves, digging through boxes, and making sure all three-dozen bags 
had consistent contents: portfolio with notepad, hand sanitizer, ink pen, handbooks covering 
ICS and other aspects of disaster preparedness, chip clip, and a stainless steel water bottle. 
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Figure 15: POD boxes before, with empty drawers and mixed contents 
Everything we needed, including stanchions, 3 of the 4 necessary POD boxes, a pop-up canopy, 
a few fold-out tables, chairs, food, ice and a few other details got packed into the emergency 
response trailer, pulled behind the disaster response Excursion and we all loaded up and were 
on our way by about 4:00 in the afternoon. Once we arrived, we setup our check-in station 
outside (complete with the sign-in sheet I made) and set up the POD in the gymnasium.  
In an exercise such as this, an agenda is key for the ease of keeping the meeting or 
training progressing in a logical fashion to keep the meeting on schedule, to keep the 
information flowing progression, and to make the information, especially that provided in 
handouts, easier for participants to follow. Following an agenda and notes also makes sure that 
key information is not overlooked and all important personnel are introduced. Finally, the 
participant packet should include a feedback survey to collect constructive criticism and ideas 
for building better future training programs.  
The third day of the training was reserved for staff to complete after-action reports and 
discuss the exercise and any problems that arose during the process. I compiled the results of 
our feedback surveys (results in Appendix F) and met with the professionals to discuss our 
training. Overall, the feedback was positive with a few pieces of constructive criticism. The final 
point I brought up from the trainings was about the POD boxes: I noted that these were in no 
way ready to be deployed in the case of a mass vaccination clinic or in the case of other needs. 
The three boxes we had at the training were a jumbled mess of office supplies, medical 
supplies, and every other type of supply you could 
want, but randomly stuffed into drawers. The 
disorganization was difficult to work with and I 
suggested that the boxes be made deployment ready. 
In talking with the county professionals, I suggested 
that instead of re-writing trainings that were already 
available, my time would be better spent preparing 
their supplies and making the POD boxes deployment 
ready. POD Box Organization 
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After assessing only a few boxes at the training, 
I knew that they were not conveniently accessible: 
many had at least one empty drawer, office supplies 
sat stuffed in with medical supplies and electrical 
extension cords were thrown in where ever they would 
fit. Once I started looking into the boxes, I realized this was a much larger undertaking than I 
originally planned: each of the 12 sites required 4 boxes (trunk, refrigerator box, 3-drawer box, 
and storage box), plus there were a few additional boxes used for educational outings to hold 
promotional items or educational items. On top of all that, I had to find all the equipment 
needed for all 48 standard POD boxes in the warehouse, with shelves stacked to the two-story 
ceiling in addition to the loft area, stocked with stanchions, coolers, pop-up tents and much 
other necessary equipment. The first part of this process involved compiling inventory lists from 
GCHD and other organizations for what should be included in a full POD deployment set. This 
information was then processed into one coherent list after consulting with Jack Ellison. He and 
I then spent an entire day working to get all that equipment into the 4 box set, trying to keep to 
a plan of using the trunk for office supplies, the refrigerator box and three-drawer box for 
medical supplies and the large open box for larger supplies like bull horns and back-stock of 
other supplies such as gloves and cotton balls. Once one full set was completed, I wrote an 
inventory list of all the boxes, all the drawers, and labeled the drawers to make sure supplies 
can be found easily and quickly when needed. I then made 48 copies of the inventory list and 
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Figure 16: Organized and labeled POD boxes (3/4 of full set) 
laminated these, to include one in each box once completed. This list was used in packing the 
remainder of the boxes.  
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Figure 17: POD supplies warehouse 
Figure 18: Outdoor workstation 
Figure 19: One full set of boxes, packed and ready for deployment 
Jack Ellison and I spent the next few weeks in the 
warehouse, in the Texas summer heat pulling out the POD 
boxes, focusing our efforts on one type of box at a time (e.g.: 
the refrigerator boxes all got packed first). Other staff 
members helped when their schedules allowed, but it was 
mostly an undertaking by Jack and myself. Once we started 
pulling out the boxes from the warehouse, we found these 
to be even more of a mess than I originally thought: all 12 of 
the three-drawer boxes were stocked with medical, office, 
and general supplies including extension cords, pens, 
individual hand sanitizer and a random collection of other 
materials, depending on which box 
was opened.  Many of the large open 
POD boxes were either completely 
empty or contained all of one type of 
resource, like finding all 15 bullhorns 
in one box, a knot of extension cords 
in another, and a large collection of 
flashlights still in their packaging in yet another. Finally and probably most frustrating was the 
amount of supplies still stocked on the shelves that needed finding, digging, and distribution 
into the boxes including sharps disposal 
containers, collapsible coolers, printers, 
and many other valuable resources. Not 
only were these resources not being put 
to good use, but they were an expensive 
asset just sitting on shelves, not even 
ready to be used. This project was almost 
completed when I reached my deadline to 
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finish my time with GCHD, and I left Jack with the instructions and last few inventory lists to 
finish the trunks of office supplies that needed finished and then the dozen sets of four POD 
boxes would be complete. I checked in at a later date and all these are packed and ready for 
deployment when needed! (Editorial note: more information on POD boxes and organization 
can be found in the next chapter.)   
Field Experience Summary 
I started my field experience with the Galveston County Health District on May 20th with 
the objectives to gain experience in public health, focusing in disaster preparedness and 
epidemiology and with the goal to build a volunteer training program for their Medical Reserve 
Corps to prepare volunteers for disaster response. Once I worked with the professionals in 
planning, participating in, and executing the three day training in late May that included a POD 
deployment, I found out that they had a much bigger need for their PODs to be ready for 
deployment than to have a training program put together. This change in goals came mainly 
from discussions with Jack Ellison, who actually showed me many different training exercises 
that were already in place at the health district, including power-points and online portions. 
This was then presented to my in-house mentor on the disaster-preparedness side who agreed 
that my time could be better spent organizing the boxes and making them deployment-ready. I 
then shifted focus to organizing the POD boxes and made them much more functional and 
ready for use in case of a disaster or other need for mass-medication.  
Hope on the Horizon 
With perseverance through multiple hurricanes and the ingenuity to hatch original 
solutions like the seawall and raising the city, Galveston has shown amazing resilience. Plans 
like the PODs and preparedness tools like the EOC speak to Galvestonians’ ability to get ready 
for whatever may come their way. A program like the proposed threat-level and preparedness-
level assessment would allow the Galveston government and emergency preparedness 
professionals to ensure that they are addressing all the needs in the area. Additionally, this 
program confronts the discrepancy between funds available and monies needed for 
preparedness efforts. In Katz’s article, one public health official described “a disproportionate 
amount of money being allocated to the ‘virtual disease’ of bioterrorism rather than real 
39 
 
disease such as TB (pg. 955).” This points out the need for funding availability for where ever it 
is deemed necessary. Having a threat-level and preparedness-level assessment program allows 
professionals to say, statistically, where discrepancies lie. If the threat-level is higher than the 
preparedness-level, then the region needs to focus more on being prepared for their local 
threats. The assessments allows them to fine-point to where this attention is needed, be it in 
preparing PODs for hurricane response or strengthening the local dam. On the other hand, if 
the preparedness-level is higher than the threat-level, then when the local health department 
receives funding labeled for “terrorism preparedness” from the Department for Homeland 
Security, it can focus this funding more into epidemiology and other measures for disease 
control and prevention rather than purchasing POD boxes or another portable disaster 
response vehicle. Finally, public-awareness campaigns and information like that found in 
Appendix G help individuals better prepare themselves and their families for disasters and no 
disaster preparedness professional can focus on their work until they know their family is safe.  
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Appendix A: List of Abbreviations 
 
BRI  Biosecurity Research Institute 
BSL (1-4) Biosafety Level (1-4) 
CDC  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
DFWS  Dam Failure Warning System 
DHS  Department of Homeland Security 
DSS  Decision Support System 
EMS  Emergency Medical Services 
EOC  Emergency Operations Center 
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency 
GCHD  Galveston County Health District 
IAP  Incident Action Plan 
IC  Incident Commander 
ICP  Incident Command Post 
ICS  Incident Command System 
KSU  Kansas State University 
MI  Managed Inventory 
MRC  Medical Reserve Corps 
NBAF  National Bio and Agro-defense Facility 
NIMS  National Incident Management System 
PDPH  Philadelphia Department of Public Health 
PHSKC  Public Health of Seattle and King County 
PIO  Public Information Officer 
POD  Point of Dispensing 
RealOpt Resource Allocation Optimization 
SNS  Strategic National Stockpile 
UTMB  University of Texas Medical Branch 
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Appendix B: Richter Scale 
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Rating Explanation   Explanation Frequency 
>2.0 Micro Micro earthquakes, not felt continual 
2.0-2.9 Minor Generally not felt, but recorded 1,300,000/year* 
3.0-3.9 Often felt, but rarely causes damage 130,000/year* 
4.0-4.9 Light Noticeable shaking of indoor items, rattling noises—significant 
damage unlikely 
13,000/year* 
5.0-5.9 Moderate Can cause major damage to poorly constructed buildings over 
small regions. At most slight damage to well-designed buildings.  
1,319/year 
6.0-6.9 Strong Can be destructive in areas up to 99 miles across in populated 
areas 
134/year 
7.0-7.9 Major Can cause serious damage over large areas 15/year 
8.0-8.9 Great Can cause serious damage in areas several hundred kilometers 
across 
1/year 
9.0-9.9 Devastating in areas several thousand kilometers across 1/10 years* 
10 + Massive Never recorded, widespread devastation across very large areas Extremely rare 
Table 4: Richter Scale (Cuadrilla, 2013) 
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Appendix C: POD Box Set Inventory 
Trunk 
Drawer #1 
4 staplers (pre-loaded) 
4 boxes staples (500 count) 
3 scissors 
2 calculators (solar and battery powered) 
1 date stamp 
12 rolls invisible tape 
8 boxes black pens (12 each) 
1 box highlighters 
5 boxes jumbo paper clips (100 count) 
12 pads post-its 
2 pads large post-its 
Drawer #2 
24 pads post-its 
3 rolls masking tape 
3 flashlights 
1 package hanging name badges (50 count) 
Drawer #3 
4 clipboards 
Drawer #4 
2 surge protectors 
2 extension cords (25 foot and 50 foot) 
 
Stacking US POD Box 
4 packages of radios (2 each) 
2 rolls of rope 
2 rolling soft-sided coolers 
1 case of clipboards (48 Masonite) 
POD signage 
1 case of tissues (30 boxes/ case with 100 tissues/ box) 
3 cases Nitrile gloves:  
 1 Medium 
 1 Large 
 1 Extra-Large 
1 case cotton balls (2 bags/ case with 2000 balls/bag) 
3 traffic directing flashlight wands 
3 cases N-95 respirators (6 boxes/ case with 20/box) 
1 printer 
2 rolls orange caution tape 
4 rolls yellow caution tape  
1 roll orange tape (not printed) 
4 1-gallon jugs of hand sanitizer 
Bull horn 
Vests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Refrigerator Box 
In-lid storage 
 Nitrile Gloves:   
1 box size small  
1 box size medium  
1 box size large  
1 box size extra-large  
Adhesive Bandages (Band-Aids) 
(+/-) Bottles of individual hand sanitizer 
Drawer #1 
 8 packages 3x3 gauze sponges (200 count) 
 2 boxes tissues 
 16 individual bottles hand sanitizer 
Drawer #2 
 3 boxes N-95 type respirators (20 count) 
 3 boxes procedure masks (50 count) 
 Extra Nitrile gloves:  
  2 boxes size medium 
  2 boxes size large 
  2 boxes size XL 
 1 box tissues 
 Table drapes  
Drawer #3 
 Bag of cotton balls (2000) 
 2 Biosharps containers 
 Handful of biohazard bags 
Note: thermometer for the refrigerator is in the 
refrigerator in its box. There is also an extension cord 
specifically for the refrigerator stored tucked in next to the 
unit.  
Large US POD Box 
In lid storage 
Adhesive Bandages (Band-Aids) 
Drawer #1 
 6 boxes tissues (100 2 ply) 
 Nitrile Gloves: 
2 boxes size small (50 count) 
  2 boxes size medium (50 count) 
  2 boxes size large (100 count) 
  2 boxes size extra-large (100 count) 
 1 package (10) protective glasses 
(+/-) 2 boxes thermometer probe covers (1000 each) 
(+/-) 1 human oral thermometer 
Drawer #2 
 8 packages 3x3 gauze sponges (200 count) 
 Nitrile Gloves:  
9 boxes size small 
  8 boxes size medium 
  7 boxes size large 
  7 boxes size extra large 
 2 extension cords (25 foot and 50 foot) 
 Sterile towel/ drapes 
Drawer #3 
 3 Biosharps containers 
 1 large bag cotton balls (2000 count) 
 First-Aid kit 
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Appendix D: POD Site-Specific Map: College of the Mainland  
 
Figure 20: POD site-specific map for COM  
Original artwork by Iris Smithey 
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Appendix E: Training Feedback Summary 
POD Training—Feedback Summary 
Location: College of the Mainland Date: May 30, 2013 
(1) highly not satisfied, (3) neutral/ no opinion or does not apply and (5) highly satisfied 
 
1. Overall effectiveness of the staff: 6 “satisfied” and 12 “highly satisfied” 
 Staff were very knowledgeable and engaging 
 The walk through was excellent 
2. Overall preparedness of the staff: 1 “neutral/ no opinion/ does not apply,” 4 “satisfied,” and 
“14”highly satisfied”   
 Missing t-shirts! 
3. Ability of the staff to answer questions: 4 “satisfied” and 15 “highly satisfied” 
4. Overall flow of the presentation/ training: 5 “satisfied” and 12 “highly satisfied” 
 Hard to hear because of gym activity 
5. Amount you feel you learned from the training: 1 “neutral,” 6 “satisfied,” and 8 “highly 
satisfied” 
  (no answer on the scale) I’ve been through this a time or two 
 Would like to do a walk through 
 I know everything prior to exercise 
6. Overall impression of the training: 6 “satisfied” and 11 “highly satisfied” 
 very good introduction to the POD concept 
7. Would you feel comfortable responding to a disaster after this training?     1 “no” 1 
“maybe” and 16 “yes” 
 it’s doable but we need to do a real drill too 
 I would feel comfortable with any position. I am able to give shots (diabetic brother) 
 (circled both yes and no) I feel prepared on how the POD works but still have would 
liked further info 
 Maybe I just need to experience the real deal 
What else could we/ should we do in future trainings to prepare volunteers?  
 Walk through what is needed to educate and train self 
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 Perhaps a setup and a walkthrough drill 
 Send out a typical scenario 
 Would like a couple of drills 
 We need a place to meet that has no interference 
 Categorize volunteers as to what area they are qualified/ comfortable in serving 
 Maybe allow volunteers to practice setting up a real POD 
What other trainings would you like to see offered in the future?  
 SNS 
 The other trainings listed in the MRC handbook 
 Maybe you can convince Popoff or Trish with COM to conduct the ICS class 100 for 
volunteers. Much better than computer class.  
 Any emergency response in Galveston County 
 Practice run through 
 Mental health services 
 Mock call-up to individual PODs 
 
Other notable notes:  
 Need to have better directions about parking/ directions on how to get there (including address) 
and parking instructions 
 Now we need to have a list of what we do with the volunteers—we’ve caught them so what do 
we do with them now? 
 Need to add unloading the trailer in to the training along with actual physical set up 
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Appendix F: Point of Dispensing Training—Agenda 
5:00 fire up the grill!  
Introductions: Name, title, why are you here? Where are you from? 
Registration 
Sign-up sheet including contact info (e-mail and phone—should have this 
printed on cardstock and then on a clipboard, possibly have 2 copies so the 
line does not bog down at just one 
5:15 eat --Ballpark bun-length all beef hot dogs on buns with condiments in hot-
dog boats 
5:45 clean up (need trashcan)—any other introductions? 
6:00 Welcome! (glad to have you, thank you, etc) 
Introduce the idea of SNS—strategic national stockpile (refer to the notes 
sheet and the “Quick Books”) 
This is then delivered to and utilized as PODs and this is where you come 
in! 
6:15 Hurricane hits (or there is a mass 
casualty event, or bioterrorism threat, 
whatever) mass panic ensues, what’s next? 
6:30 Walk the whole group through the POD 
set up in the gym—go over the map first and 
discuss the overall flow pointing out points of 
security/ police intervention and also where 
each section will be stationed 
 Challenge the group to come up with 
problems  to overcome/ problem-solve 
 As we go though each station, this is the time to hand-out the just in time 
training sheets for each station and then review what will be required at 
each station—be sure to point out that they may be responsible for helping 
out at multiple stations during one shift so that they don’t get bored doing 
the same thing for a 12-hour shift 
7:15 (ish) Break-down and have them help us pack it all back up so that they can 
see how/ where it all goes 
7:45Conclusion with summary, inspirational remarks, questions, and make sure 
everyone fills out their review form (how did we do? What else would you like to 
see?)  
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Figure 21: Infographic on hurricane 
proofing one's home (Wallace, 2013) 
Appendix G: How to Hurricane Proof your Home Infographic 
 
Due to necessity of fitting this image on one page, some of the 
text became difficult to read. Selected paraphrases from the 
image are enlarged below.  
 8000 casualties= the number of people hurt by a 
hurricane that struck Galveston, TX on 9/8/1900 (editorial note: 
this caused Galveston to build the seawall to help prevent this 
kind of devastation in the future) 
 155= the number of Atlantic hurricanes in the last 
decade 
 $108 billion= the cost of damage caused by hurricane 
Katrina—the most expensive hurricane in history 
 165 recorded deaths + 165 recorded deaths= the cost of 
hurricane Sandy 
 80% of residential hurricane damage starts with wind 
entry through garage doors 
 $1200= the average cost of a “hurricane proof” garage 
door 
 Editorial note: building a safe room underground is not 
suggested for hurricanes because most hurricanes are in coastal 
areas with a high water table. Even if one is able to build a 
basement (which is not possible in southeast Texas), these are 
likely to flood in the case of a hurricane. In a conversation with 
a Beaumont deputy sheriff who was responsible for community 
safety during and after hurricane Rita, he said that the police 
department was not able to stay open because their generator 
is in the basement and it was flooded within a few hours of the 
storm’s beginning.  
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 95%= the % of roofs damaged during hurricane Andrew 
 3.5 million= the # of homes without power during Sandy 
